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Abstract: 
 
 We implement panel data econometrics on non-linear empirical models to investigate how the 
firms’ market value is related with cash holdings and ownership concentration, on non-
financial listed companies in Greece, before (2000-2009) and during the Eurozone crisis 2010-
2015.  
 
It is confirmed the existence of an optimum level of cash (CASH) and the top 5 major 
shareholders ownership (OWN5) at which firms’ return on equity (ROE) has been maximized 
(concave function), especially over the crisis period and the total one. Yet, a convex function of 
the Tobin’s Q ratio (Q) on OWN5 has also been revealed significant for all sample periods.   
 
The findings support the tradeoff theory and the new kind of agency cost literature on 
expropriation effects of the minority by the majority. Interaction terms have also been found 
statistically significant, confirming that the special context of the Eurozone has influenced 
business, in the narrow Athens Stock Exchange (ASE).  
 
The estimated averages that maximize firms’ market values (for instance ROE), in relation to 
either CASH (0.83 of net assets, during the whole sample period 2000-’15, while 0.77 in the 
crisis one 2010-’15) or OWN5 (0.10 of equity, during 2000-’15, while 0.36 in the crisis one 
2010-’15) could be useful for both investors and policy makers in Greece, a member-country of 
“sui generis” Eurozone, with an unsustainable public debt. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the relationship between efficiency and cash holdings as well as 
ownership concentration of Greek non-financial listed firms in the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE), during 2000-2015.  Based on non-linear effects of cash and 
ownership on efficiency and examining their implications depended on the sampled 
sub-periods before or after 2010, when the outbreak of the crisis, of the Greek public 
debt or in general that one of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European 
Union (EMU or Eurozone) (Gibson et al., 2014). 
 
The motivation of using efficiency functions on both cash and ownership comes 
from the hypothesis “the radical macro-economic changes done in Greece during its 
course on the Eurozone, 2000-2015, should be reflected to the business micro-
economic level too”.  This route resulted, firstly, in liquidity crisis, and secondly in 
inevitably twin crisis of the Greek public debt and the banking one (Provopoulos, 
2014; De Grauwe, 2011).  The huge capital inflows to the country, since its 
accession into the EMU up to the burst of the crisis (2000-2009), invested in the 
ASE, widely spread the ownership of the Greek listed firms, while the leveraged 
economic growth, has challenged higher business returns and accompanied with 
respective liquidity.   
 
The opposite picture has been observed the crisis-period 2010-2015. Market 
discipline hypothesis (Lane, 1993) did not really work, because both the market 
interest’s punishment put country’s solvency at risk and the responsiveness of EU-
Greek governing has made the sovereign debt un-sustainable [i] (IMF, 2017; IMF, 
2010), “aggravating the very illness it is supposed to cure” (Rommerskirchen, 2015).  
Deepening the recession [ii] has provoked important business losses and decreased 
liquidity [iii] as well, while massive capital outflows [iv] have contributed to 
ownership concentration.  
 
These macro-economic trends are come true with the study’s dataset concerning 
both the ownership concentration and cash holdings as can be seen in descriptive 
statistics of Table 2. However, methodologically, this paper considers the macro-
economic framework to be exogenous, with two distinct sub-periods, growth and 
recession (or more precisely “depression”), with the landmark in 2010, the same 
year of launching and starting of the European-Greek responsiveness to the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis (Thalassinos et al., 2015a; 2015b; Thalassinos and 
Stamatopoulos, 2105). 
 
The relevant finance literature on corporate cash holdings management (Martinez-
Sola et al., 2013) assumes that managers, either, follow a partial adjustment 
mechanism to reach a target cash level theoretically existed, or seek to improve 
marginal value of cash for shareholders, depending on different circumstances of 
business environment, e.g., firm-specific and time-varying information asymmetry 
or investment opportunities or quality of management or institutional conditions 
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related to investors’ protection or corporate financial management (Drobetz et al., 
2010; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007; Dittmar and Martin-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz 
et al., 2006; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Liapis et al., 2013; Thalassinos and 
Politis, 2011).  In ownership concentration literature on the doubtful impact of 
management in firm’s wealth maximization (Alimehmeti and Paletta, 2012; Ameer, 
2012), the agency theory prevails, yet with its opposite hypotheses (hypo). The 
“alignment hypo.” considers that high managerial ownership and good internal 
governance are positive factors on firm valuation, because, when managers align 
their interests with shareholders, agency costs fall, raising firm’s ability for external 
finance and decreasing the need of cash accumulation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
 
Nevertheless, the “retrenchment hypo.” predicts that higher ownership gives more 
power to managers who can resist on willing of outside shareholders (Berle and 
Means, 1933; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Reinforcing no systematic relation between 
ownership structure and firm value other studies find non-monotonic relationship 
(Morck et al., 1988) or inverse function, that is, profit-maximizing interests of 
shareholders may cause ownership concentration (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
 
The paper makes two contributions to the finance literature. First, it discusses both 
“cash and ownership” factors of the market values of listed firms, justified by the 
special case of Greece, and time span of the sample. Second, the panel data 
estimations of the last two drivers, using Greek data and sample period 2000-2015, it 
is the first time presented to the literature. 
 
Thus, the article considers non-linear relationships (concaves) between either cash 
holdings or ownership structure and firm value, addressing the general question: in 
this special context of Greece within the Eurozone 2000-2015, how are cash 
holdings and ownership concentration related with market valuation of listed firms 
in the ASE? The latter is elaborated in two research hypotheses to be tested 
econometrically. The results are mixed and interesting. It is confirmed that the 
sample data is consistent with a concave function of return on equity (ROE) on cash 
holdings during both the whole sample period 2000-2015 and sovereign debt crisis 
2010-2015, while on ownership structure is true, only in the latter one 2010-2015.  
 
The same pattern, of concave function of the Tobin’s Q ratio (Q) on cash holdings 
has also been confirmed statistically for the study’s sample (2000-2015, and 2010-
2015). Nevertheless, the data are consistent with a convex function of Q on 
ownership (for all three periods, 2000-’15, 2000-’09 and 2010-’15), indicating that 
the “inverse optimal” level get minimized Q value, and after that, increasing 
concentration of owners raises efficiency, as measured by Q. In almost all estimated 
empirical models’ interaction terms such as “leverage and 2010-’15 crisis period” or 
“firm’s size growth and 2010-’15 crisis period” have been proved statistically 
significant, confirming that this special economic and political context has seriously 
influenced business adjustment, in the ASE listed firms. 
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The paper is structured as follows: in the next section it is briefly reviewed relevant 
literature. In section 3 it is derived the research hypotheses, the data and 
methodology chosen, as well as, the empirical models to be used to test 
econometrically the question. Section 4 reports and discusses the results, while main 
conclusions and implications of the study conclude the article. 
 
2. Relevant literature review 
 
In an efficient or perfect market of the textbook there is no need of liquidity 
management because the external finance is always available at equilibrium market 
prices. That is, the capital allocation in cash or equivalent assets would not affect 
firm’s market valuation (Opler et al., 2001; Stiglitz, 1974).  
 
However, market imperfections imply that financial management balances costs and 
benefits of holding cash, that is, it matters for shareholders’ wealth. Transactional 
and precautionary motives for hoarding cash from the firms are among the benefits 
well known from Keynes early as 1936. The transactional motif arises from the 
operation expenses to cover company’s turnover or enable firms to make 
diversifying acquisitions, while precautionary one may result by undertaking 
valuable projects when they arise or avoid distress costs when the firms face adverse 
cash flow shocks.  
 
Nevertheless, cash holdings imply not only an opportunity cost but in addition, raise 
agency problems because free cash flows give managers discretionary power over 
shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1986). Likewise, higher cash holdings may have a 
cost-of-curry, i.e., the difference between debit interest to finance an additional unit 
of currency and return on hoarding cash, or avoid external financing that could result 
in the additional cost associated to the lack of monitoring firms from the markets 
(Dittmar et al., 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
 
Depending on firm-specific characteristics, information asymmetry between demand 
and supply of external funds often results in adverse selection of capital allocation, 
which would imply underinvestment because it may pass up a project of positive net 
present value (NPV), as corporations do not desire to issue under valuated securities.  
On the other hand, higher cash holdings, reducing external funding dependence, 
would offer to managers more “degrees of freedom” to overtake value-enhanced 
investments which could refuse it, otherwise. The latter is also invoked by the free 
cash flow theory (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Dosoung and Sangsoo, 1997; Jensen, 
1986; Myers, 1977). 
 
Thus, trade-off between benefits and costs of cash holdings may cause an optimum 
level such as the model of Kim et al. (1998) predicts. The latter is in line with 
agency theory’s literature where cash accumulation is not uniformly beneficial 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Luo and Hachiya, 2005; Lee et al., 2004; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). 
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The relationship between firm economic performance and ownership structure is 
also a topic of great interest in the literature, either in strategic management 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Li and Simerly, 1998; Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; 
Oswald and Jahera, 1991) or corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) or 
agency theory (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 1999;  Hill and Snell, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Amihud and Lev, 
1981; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
Generally, the literature predicts a positive or concave function of firms’ market 
value on ownership concentration. However, there is also a research stream which 
suggests the inverse function as true, i.e., that ownership structure may be influenced 
by firm’s efficiency, and not vice versa (Chang, 2003; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Demsetz, 1983).  
 
Thus, in the logic of agency cost literature, financial and reputational benefits of 
managers in product or market diversification and fast corporate growth by non-
related mergers and acquisitions, which provide them with risk reduction, preference 
of expenses or empire building, are facilitated by widely-held firm’s ownership. 
Equivalently, lower ownership concentration provides lower control of management 
which could not follow owners’ interest in maximizing firm’s market value. That is, 
large shareholders may act as “controlling mechanism” by monitoring managers and 
preventing “free riding”. So, their control is negatively related to diversification 
strategy since opposed to large shareholders’ wealth maximization.  
 
This analysis consistent with the upward part of the concave function “firm’s market 
value-ownership concentration” has an upper limit, economically understandable, 
when managers become entrenched and start expropriating minority shareholders’ 
wealth. Thus, the literature has suggested another kind of the agency problem, 
consistent especially with European markets, the conflict “controlling owners vs. 
minority shareholders” instead of the traditional “ownership vs. management”.  
 
Despite this long debate, there is no empirical evidence on the effects of both cash 
holdings and ownership concentration on firms’ market value in Europe and 
especially in country-members of the EMU under an ongoing sovereign debt crisis. 
This paper aims to fill this gap. Alimehmeti and Paletta (2012) investigated the 
relationship “return on assets (ROA) - ownership concentration” for listed firms in 
Italy before Eurozone crisis (2006-’09). This work in conjunction with those of 
Ameer’s (2012) and Martinez-Sola’s et al. (2013) are the more relevant for the 
present study. Thus, it is provided a summary of them in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of selected relevant literature 
Authors Relevant 
theory/ 
Depend. vars./ 
Sample Data Independent vars. 
(Significance: + pos., - neg., ± 
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Methods. fuzzy, Not Signif.) 
Martinez-
Sola et al., 
(2013) 
Agency theory, 
Corporate 
Finance 
theory, Trade-
off theory /  
market value 
of the firm / 
GMM panel 
data estimation 
Obs=3055, N=472 
US industrial firms, 
T=7 years (2001-
07), K=5 
independent vars., 
Source: Osiris 
database 
(Firm Value: Q, Market-to-Book1, 
Market-to-Book2)  
1. Cash (+), (+), (+)  
2. Cash2 (-), (-), (-) 
3. Intangible (-), (-), (-) 
4. Size (-), (-), (-) 
5. Leverage (+), (+), (+) 
Ameer 
(2012) 
Agency theory 
/ Tobin’s Q 
ratio, market 
value of the 
firm / GMM 
panel data 
estimation 
Obs=1345, N=389 
non-finance. 
Australian listed 
firms, T=11 years 
(1995-2005), K=11 
independent vars., 
Source: 
Worldscope 
 
 
(Firm Value: Q, V) 
1. Cash (+), (+) 
2. Ownership (-), (-) 
3. Cash×Own (-), (-) 
4. CRG (ns), (-), (dummy 
var. used to capture a 
structural change due to a 
regulatory reform on 
corporate governance for 
firms) 
5. CRG×Own (ns), (-) 
6. Cash×CRG×Own (ns), 
(+)  
7. R&D expenses/Total Net 
Assets (+), (+) 
8. Dividend (-), (+) 
9. Capital expenditures (+), 
(+) 
10. Debt (+), (+) 
11. Size (-), (+) 
Alimehmeti 
and Paletta 
(2012) 
Agency theory 
/ ROA / OLS 
regression, 
cross section 
data 
Obs/year: 
186/2006, 
201/2007, 
188/2008, 
224/2009, N=203 
Italian listed firms, 
T=4 years, K=4 
independent vars., 
Source: Amadeus 
Years: 2006, ‘07, ‘08, ’09. 
1. Own. concentration (NS), 
(NS), (+), (NS) 
2. Own. Concentration2 
(NS), (NS), (-), (NS) 
3. Leverage (+), (NS), (NS), 
(+) 
4. Size (+), (+), (+), (+) 
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3. Research hypotheses, data and methodology 
 
Considering the relevant literature briefly presented in the previous section, and the 
empirical gap of no evidence on the effects of cash and ownership on firms’ market 
value in Europe, this paper is intended to contribute to the literature filling in this 
gap. Thus, it is worthwhile to address the question: “In Sui Generis EMU 
(Eichengreen, 2008) and especially in a country under sovereign debt crisis (Greece, 
2000-2015), how are cash holdings and ownership concentration related to the 
market valuation of listed firms in the ASE? The latter is approximated in this study, 
as usual in the literature, by the return on equity (ROE) and the Tobin’s Q ratio (Q) 
measures.  
 
In this paper is expected, based on the financial theory and the special business and 
economic context of Greece and the Eurozone over the sampled period 2000-2015 
that both functions (ROE, Q) should be concave upon cash holdings and ownership 
concentration. This should especially be true over the Eurozone crisis, mainly 
characterized by consequences of the effective bankruptcy of the Greek public sector 
in 2010. The establishment of austerity policies by the EU-Greek governing to serve 
the Greek Sovereign Debt [v] deepened the crisis, because, at least, the public 
sector’s suppliers couldn’t be paid, given that there wasn’t demand for its new bond 
issues.  
 
Gradually private sector couldn’t meet its liabilities, given its weak international 
competitiveness, and the collapse of absorption in domestic markets, because of 
drastic restrictive policies applied. Several reasons could be the continuous wage 
cuts [vi] or the breakdown of asset prices [vii] due to the trigger of the country risk 
and the associated huge outflows of invested funds in Greece. Thus, economically 
supported the first research hypothesis, which should empirically be tested, is: 
  
H1: the relationship between market value of firms (as measured by ROE or 
Q) and cash holdings as well as ownership concentration is likely to be 
nonlinear (concave) in the studied sample. 
 
Moreover, the economy’s context relevant characteristics should give the shape in 
the general relationship of the H1. So, the size growth or the leverage level of the 
sampled firms, independently or interacting with crisis’ dummy variable are also 
expected to support economically a second research hypothesis to be tested: 
 
H2: the relationship between market value of firms (ROE or Q) and cash 
holdings as well as ownership concentration is likely to be shaped by control 
variables like size growth or leverage level, independently or interacting with 
Eurozone’s crisis variable, in the present Greek panel dataset. 
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The data of the sample have been drawn from Thomson Reuters/Eikon database and 
refer to basic balance sheets and income statements items. As commonly in the 
literature (see Table 1) this study uses a panel dataset of non-financial listed firms in 
the ASE, during 2000-2015. Of the full sample of 217 firms with 3,025 firm-year 
observations, they are excluded these ones with fewer observations than five 
consecutive years including both sub-periods. The sample resulted to contain 183 
companies representing 1,524 firm-year observations of the unbalanced Greek panel 
dataset, 2000-2015. 
 
Two proxy variables have been used to measure the dependent variable of market 
valuation of firms, that of the return on equity (ROE = Net Income before Extra. 
Items / Total Shareholder's Equity) and the Tobin’s Q ratio (Q = Market 
Capitalization / Total Asset Value). The key independent variables are the cash 
holdings [CASH = Cash & Short-Term Investments / Net Assets (= Assets - Cash & 
Short-Term Investments)] and ownership concentration (OWN5 = the percentage of 
shares held by the top 5 major shareholders, as a proxy to Ownership Concentration 
on Common Shares Outstanding). The square values of both the key independent 
variables, i.e., CASHsq (= CASH2) and OWN5sq (= OWN52) serve to test the likely 
of non-linear relationships. The positive or negative part of the expected concave 
function of ROE or Q on CASH and OWN5 should be below their optimal levels.  
 
In the empirical models are also included control variables usually referred to the 
literature, like, the firm size in levels or growth rate [SIZE = ln(Net Assets) or 
SIZEgr = SIZEt – SIZEt-1], the leverage (LEV = Total Debt / Total Assets or LEV2 = 
Total Debt / Market Capitalization), the net working capital [NWC = (Current Assets 
– Current Liabilities - Cash & Short Term Investments) / Net Assets], the cash flows 
[CF =  (EBITDA - Interest Expense On Debt - Income Taxes - Dividends Per Share) 
/ Net Assets], the market to book value ratio [MTOB = (Market Capitalization / Total 
Shareholder's Equity], and the dividends [DIV = Common Dividends (Cash) / Net 
Assets].  
 
To test the second research hypothesis, they were constructed the interaction terms, 
LEVERAGE x CRISIS (LEVCRISIS = LEV x dcrisis) where dcrisis is a dummy 
variable equals 1 when time t 2010 and 0 otherwise, and SIZEgr x CRISIS 
(SIZEgrCRISIS = SIZEgr x dcrisis).  
 
The implicit assumption for the crisis dummy variable is that it is assumed a 
structural break in 2010 when Greek government signed the loans offered by the 
lenders mainly EU partners (European Commission –EC-, European Central Bank –
ECB-, European Stability Mechanism -ESM-, and International Monetary Fund –
IMF-), the terms of which have radically changed the conditions of the local 
markets. 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the study’s variables distinguishing 
between the whole sample period 2000-2015 and two sub-periods, i.e., the euphoria 
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times 2000-2009 and during the Eurozone crisis 2010-2015. The heterogeneity of 
the dataset results effortlessly from high dispersion, skewness and kurtosis for 
almost all variables.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Pooled data 2000-2015: 
Stats ROE Q CAS
H 
OW
N5 
LEV LEV
2 
SIZ
E 
NW
C 
CF MTO
B 
DIV 
N 2,85
0 
2,93
7 
3,02
5 
1,97
1 
3,02
2 
2,92
7 
3,02
5 
3,00
9 
2,80
4 
2,75
5 
3,02
5 
Min -
87.7
99 
0.00
1 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
13.6
36 
-
5.09
1 
-
1.73
3 
0.00
1 
0.00
0 
Max 31.2
37 
26.0
39 
3.27
3 
0.99
5 
5.09
5 
706.
446 
23.0
51 
0.75
4 
0.77
8 
99.2
10 
12.6
12 
Sd 2.23
9 
1.00
6 
0.18
8 
0.27
8 
0.27
7 
21.5
22 
1.42
9 
0.31
8 
0.12
5 
3.77
3 
0.23
6 
Mean -
0.15
8 
0.58
5 
0.10
7 
0.24
4 
0.34
1 
4.28
3 
18.2
62 
0.01
6 
0.01
9 
1.70
9 
0.01
8 
p50 0.02
8 
0.32
2 
0.04
6 
0.10
0 
0.31
9 
0.91
9 
18.1
63 
0.05
1 
0.03
2 
0.93
8 
0.00
0 
skew
ness 
-
24.5
45 
12.2
90 
5.64
4 
1.01
2 
4.26
8 
20.2
92 
0.26
5 
-
3.88
2 
-
3.02
7 
14.5
31 
50.7
19 
kurtos
is 
909.
125 
265.
239 
57.7
02 
2.68
9 
52.2
10 
540.
910 
3.28
2 
43.0
72 
32.9
15 
304.
227 
2,70
4.17
8 
 
Panel B. Pooled data for the pre-crisis period 2000-2009: 
Stats ROE Q CAS
H 
OW
N5 
LE
V 
LEV
2 
SIZ
E 
NW
C 
CF MTO
B 
DIV 
N 1,825 1,779 1,83
8 
1,08
0 
1,8
34 
1,76
9 
1,83
8 
1,8
28 
1,64
0 
1,759 1,838 
Min -
45.01
3 
0.016 0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.0
00 
0.00
0 
13.6
36 
-
1.6
14 
-
1.09
7 
0.059 0.000 
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Max 31.23
7 
26.03
9 
3.27
3 
0.97
7 
1.4
89 
29.2
03 
23.0
51 
0.7
17 
0.77
8 
99.21
0 
12.612 
Sd 1.347 1.211 0.19
9 
0.16
6 
0.1
86 
2.29
0 
1.36
0 
0.2
06 
0.09
1 
4.499 0.300 
Mean 0.022 0.782 0.11
2 
0.09
6 
0.2
89 
1.25
7 
18.2
85 
0.0
89 
0.04
9 
2.107 0.025 
p50 0.052 0.502 0.04
8 
0.03
4 
0.2
94 
0.56
4 
18.2
16 
0.0
93 
0.04
5 
1.232 0.005 
skewn
ess 
-
14.04
4 
11.09
1 
5.98
3 
2.92
4 
0.4
99 
5.25
9 
0.30
0 
-
0.7
89 
-
1.36
0 
12.99
9 
40.371 
kurtos
is 
847.0
80 
200.7
10 
64.2
36 
11.9
27 
4.6
37 
42.7
63 
3.29
2 
7.2
02 
33.6
60 
230.4
18 
1,691.
759 
 
Panel C. Pooled data during the crisis-period 2010-2015: 
Stats ROE Q CAS
H 
OW
N5 
LEV LEV2 SIZ
E 
NW
C 
CF MT
OB 
DIV 
N 1,025 1,15
8 
1,18
7 
891 1,18
8 
1,158 1,18
7 
1,18
1 
1,16
4 
996 1,187 
Min -
87.70
0 
0.00
1 
0.00
0 
0.00
1 
0.00
0 
0.000 13.7
10 
-
5.09
1 
-
1.73
2 
0.00
1 
0.000 
Max 4.082 4.46
9 
1.83
0 
0.99
5 
5.09
4 
706.4
00 
22.8
30 
0.75
4 
0.64
2 
26.7
40 
1.202 
Sd 3.249 0.40
3 
0.16
9 
0.28
2 
0.36
3 
33.58
0 
1.52
9 
0.41
4 
0.15
2 
1.69
2 
0.045 
Mean -
0.478 
0.28
4 
0.09
9 
0.42
3 
0.42
1 
8.904 18.2
25 
-
0.09
7 
-
0.02
4 
1.00
5 
0.007 
p50 -
0.041 
0.15
9 
0.04
2 
0.40
1 
0.37
3 
2.295 18.1
07 
-
0.01
8 
0.00
3 
0.49
3 
0.000 
skewn
ess 
-
20.32
7 
4.19
7 
4.59
9 
0.10
4 
4.23
3 
13.09
2 
0.24
0 
-
3.71
8 
-
3.14
4 
6.72
5 
19.00
0 
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kurtos
is 
518.4
85 
28.7
77 
32.7
14 
1.79
8 
40.6
11 
223.4
52 
3.18
7 
33.2
02 
26.9
16 
75.6
00 
459.0
58 
Notes: See section 3 for the definition of the variables. 
 
Given extremely negative skewness and high kurtosis for ROE in either sub-periods, 
low positive mean (median) value of 2.2% (5.2%) during euphoria period 2000-2009 
has been proved unsound over the crisis one 2010-2015, when it has been reversed 
to strongly negative -47.8% (-4.1%). So totally for the full sample period 2000-2015 
has been turned to negative -15.8% on average while slightly positive 2.8% for the 
median value.  
 
Nevertheless, the comparison of the aggregate firms’ frequency distributions for the 
Tobin’s Q ratio before (2000-2009) and during the crisis (2010-2015) reveals the 
depth and the extent of the impact of the crisis on the depreciation of their assets, or 
the redistribution of production capabilities of the Greek economy or even the likely 
expropriation of minority’s ownership from large shareholders. Throughout the 
whole sample period listed firms remain too much undervalued with a Q mean 
(median) value of 58% (32%) within a framework of high volatility and extreme 
skewness and kurtosis coefficients, supporting to use the median as the appropriate 
trend measure.  
 
Although it is much more apparent the gradually trend to approximate from distance 
normality through the first sample sub-period to the second one, the average 
(median) value of the stocks of listed firms’ in the ASE have fallen to 78% (50%) of 
the replacement cost of their assets before the crisis (2000-2009), while they have 
collapsed to 28% (16%), during the crisis (2010-2015). Table 3 shows the 
correlation matrix. Among the independent variables it is not observed high pairwise 
correlations (except LEV-NWC) supporting the possibility of not having 
multicollinearity problems. 
 
Table 3. Pairwise Correlations for the pooled data 2000-2015 
 ROE Q CASH OWN5 LEV LEV2 SIZE NWC CF MTOB DI
V 
ROE 1.0000            
Q 0.0663* 1.0000           
CAS
H 
0.0584* 0.2345*   1.0000         
OW
N5 
-
0.0555* 
-
0.1451*  
-0.0326 1.0000         
LEV -
0.1302* 
-
0.2317*  
-
0.2701* 
0.2115*   1.0000       
LEV - - - 0.0775*   0.2486*   1.0000      
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2 0.1405* 0.0998*  0.0705* 
SIZE 0.0072 -
0.1278*  
-
0.0461* 
-
0.1035*   
0.1379*   0.1021
* 
1.0000      
NWC 0.1542* 0.0993*  -0.0180 -
0.2221*  
-
0.6468* 
-
0.2485
* 
-
0.1343* 
1.0000     
CF 0.2099* 0.2020*   0.2587* -
0.1941*  
-
0.4448* 
-
0.3028
* 
0.1058* 0.4200* 1.0000    
MT
OB 
-
0.2661* 
0.6810*   0.0629* -
0.0811*     
0.0163 -
0.0453
* 
-
0.0735* 
-
0.0707* 
0.0787* 1.0000   
DIV 0.0116 0.0777*   0.0905* -0.0327   -
0.0563* 
-0.0130 0.0136 -0.0062 0.1176* 0.0406* 1.0
00
0 
Note: See section 3 for the definition of the variables. The asterisk (*) stands for correlation 
coefficients significant at the 5% level or better. 
 
For the described dependent variables (ROE or Q), they are used two models 
to test empirically if the data are consistent with the above addressed question 
as it is identified by the relevant research hypotheses. Thus, in the following 
equation (1) the dependent variable, the market value in firm (i) at time (t), 
 , takes the form of ROE in model 1, while that of Q in model 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
It could reasonably be argued that ASE, even after 2002 when the Euro has been 
launched in Greece, did not manage to get away from a “Thin Market” having high 
price and volume volatility while low liquidity, claiming the economy attracted in 
total, nearly zero foreign direct and indirect investments that period. The relevant 
ratio to GDP was on average 6.5% net inflows, during 2000-2009, while -12% net 
outflows over the crisis period 2010-2015 [viii].  
 
Thus, it is logical to assume that listed firms in the ASE, throughout the sample 
period, were considering as priority, among their goals, to maximize the wealth of 
the shareholders to be able to finance cheap their operations.  Hence, because of the 
nature of the ASE, market value of the listed firms of this sample should be caused 
by cash and ownership structure, as well as, other control variables presented in 
equation (1), i.e., it makes sense to assume no-endogeneity problems in this study. 
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Consequently, it seems appropriate to use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
estimators to fit the unbalanced panel-dataset to models 1 for ROE and 2 for Q. 
Moreover, because the sample includes non-financial heterogeneous (from all 
sectors of the economy) corporations it is logical to expect to have AR(1) 
autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation, as well as, 
heteroskedasticity across panels. STATA v.12.1 software used, offers these options 
to meet the sample’s needs. 
 
4. Estimations and Discussion 
 
Table 4 (or 5 respectively) presents the results of the estimation of model 1 (or 2 
respectively) using as proxy of the market value of the firms the ROE (or Q 
respectively) variable. The concave function of ROE or Q on CASH is strongly (at 
1% level of statistical significance) confirmed for the full sample period (2000-2015) 
and during the crisis sub-period (2010-2015), allowing not to reject the first research 
hypothesis (H1). This means that the increases in cash holdings raise the valuation of 
listed firms in the ASE up to the optimal level, while after that the opposite happens. 
Thus, the estimated averages which maximizing firms’ market values as measured 
by ROE (see table 4), in relation to CASH are 0.83 of net assets, during the whole 
sampled period 2000-’15, while 0.77 in the crisis one 2010-’15.  
 
The respective figures maximizing ROE in terms of OWN5 are 0.10 of equity, 
during 2000-’15, while 0.36 in the crisis one 2010-’15. These estimations could be 
useful for both investors and policy makers. However, linear and positive 
statistically significant relationships have been detected between ROE or Tobin’s Q 
ratio (Q) and CASH, for the sub-period 2000-2009. The latter evidence may be 
understood by the euphoria that was prevailing the first decade of the EMU’s 
common markets existence where all figures had just an upward tendency. Given the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008, and the resulting credit 
scarcity (Calomiris and Haber, 2014), the firms seem “to remember” the opportunity 
cost for money demand (companies’ cash holdings), reflected in the estimations 
through the concave relationships ROE-CASH or Q-CASH over the Eurozone crisis 
period 2010-2015, where an optimal level of cash holdings makes sense to seek out. 
 
About the expected (H1) concave function of the market (ASE) value of Greek firms 
on OWN5 (the percentage of shares held by the top 5 major shareholders) it is 
strongly confirmed statistically significant only for the crisis sub-period (2010-2015) 
and only if firms’ value approximated by the ROE variable. However, H1 it is not 
accepted, for all three sample periods, in the case of the relationship Q-OWN5 which 
has proved statistically significant but, in contrast of H1, here as a convex function.  
 
This, it could be understood based on descriptive statistics (Table 2) for the 
“replacement cost” variable Q which collapsed in terms of the median value at 16% 
in the crisis period, from 50% respectively during the euphoria one. The latter fact 
should be considered in combination with respective trend statistics of OWN5, where 
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top 5 major investors have many times multiplied their companies’ ownership, i.e., 
from 9.6% on average (or 3.4% in median terms) in the 2000-2009 period, jumped to 
42.3% (40.1%) respectively in crisis period 2010-2015.   
 
In addition, major shareholder’s type has changed between two subsequent periods, 
expressing qualitative changes too, in ownership concentration procedure; in the 
study’s sample, their descending classification, on average became Government 
Agency 45% (55%), (Private Equity, 45%), Holding Company 41% (34%), 
Corporation 29% (30%) and Individual Investor 22% (26%) during 2000-2009 
(2010-2015) periods.   
 
So, it may be understood the convex function of Q on OWN5 as an indication of 
verification to have happened “expropriation effects” for stocks in the ASE which 
throughout the 16 years sample period were undervalued (trend statistics, Q<1). 
Thus, in the first downward slope of this Q function when ownership concentration 
increases it may be expected a fall in market capitalization until a minimum level 
(breakpoint) reaches, when new large shareholders take on the management and new 
era of confidence by the market is gradually restored (translating its upward slope). 
That is, the new kind of agency cost theory that one which the controlling owners 
expropriate value from the minority, seems to be consistent with the fit of our data to 
model 2 (equation 1, with dependent variable the Tobin’s Q ratio). 
 
Table 4. Estimations for the Efficiency equations (ROE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ROE 
FGLS Hetero & psar1 
2000-15 
ROE 
FGLS Hetero & psar1 
2000-09 
ROE 
FGLS Hetero & psar1 
2010-15 
    
CASH 0.710*** 0.0668** 1.158*** 
 (18.96) (2.262) (28.13) 
CASHsq -0.429*** -0.0146 -0.753*** 
 (-9.622) (-0.408) (-9.876) 
OWN5 0.0198 0.000279 0.0893*** 
 (0.745) (0.00785) (6.408) 
OWN5sq -0.0951*** -0.0271 -0.123*** 
 (-3.096) (-0.494) (-6.449) 
LEVCRISIS -0.420***  -0.349*** 
 (-29.11)  (-40.22) 
SIZEgrCRISIS 0.743***  0.868*** 
 (44.32)  (81.30) 
NWC 0.323*** 0.135*** 0.547*** 
 (30.12) (12.37) (46.37) 
ΜΤΟΒ 0.00508** 0.0260*** -0.112*** 
 (2.401) (13.81) (-24.21) 
DIV 0.863*** 1.143*** 0.847*** 
 (6.587) (11.11) (4.509) 
LEV2  -0.0185***  
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  (-13.73)  
SIZEgr  0.0868***  
  (11.66)  
Constant -0.0651*** -0.0106** -0.0465*** 
 (-16.49) (-2.230) (-8.615) 
    
Observations 1,524 818 671 
Number of id 183 133 164 
 
Table 5. Estimations for the Efficiency equations (Tobin’s Q ratio) 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Q 
FGLS Hetero & psar1 
2000-15 
Q 
FGLS Hetero & psar1 
2000-09 
Q 
FGLS Hetero & psar1 
2010-15 
    
CASH 0.851*** 0.971*** 0.262*** 
 (8.776) (9.475) (6.338) 
CASHsq -0.435*** 0.155 -0.290*** 
 (-4.374) (0.703) (-7.165) 
OWN5 -0.500*** -0.327** -0.224*** 
 (-7.760) (-2.444) (-7.779) 
OWN5sq 0.437*** 0.448** 0.235*** 
 (6.178) (2.280) (7.592) 
LEVCRISIS -0.386***  -0.464*** 
 (-12.19)  (-21.77) 
SIZEgrCRISIS -0.00874  -0.0801*** 
 (-0.379)  (-11.17) 
NWC 0.155*** 0.341*** 0.0477*** 
 (4.536) (7.837) (5.394) 
DIV 5.420*** 5.474*** 3.547*** 
 (13.03) (13.80) (19.84) 
LEV2  -0.0965***  
  (-20.14)  
SIZEgr  0.113***  
  (4.053)  
Constant 0.442*** 0.583*** 0.439*** 
 (29.29) (41.90) (33.17) 
    
Observations 1,524 818 671 
Number of id 183 133 164 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: See section 3 for the definition of the variables. Blocked Adaptive Computationally 
Efficient Outlier Nominators (BACON) algorithm proposed by Billor, Hadi, and Velleman 
(2000), has been applied to the whole set of dependent and explanatory variables used in 
estimations presented in both Tables 4 and 5. The 5th percentile (percentile=0.05) of the chi-
squared distribution has been used as a large enough threshold to separate outliers from 
nonoutliers, and remove them from the final estimations. The routine is offered by STATA 
v.12.1 we have used. 
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Likewise, in almost all estimated empirical models, the interaction terms “leverage” 
(LEV) or “firm’s size growth” (SIZEgr) associated with the dummy for the “crisis 
sub-period 2010-2015” (dcrisis) have been proven statistically significant. This 
evidence could be understood as that the special economic and political context of 
the Eurozone crisis has seriously influenced business adjustment in the ASE listed 
firms. In other words, no matter what ROE or Q it is used as the dependent variable, 
the good fit of the sample data on equation 1 it seems to allow not rejecting the 
second research hypothesis (H2). 
 
Regarding to control variables, net working capital (NWC) appears strongly 
statistically significant in both estimated models (ROE, Q) and as it is expected with 
higher (lower) coefficient in turbulent times of 2010-2015 for ROE (Q) function. 
Dividends (DIV) variable has also been found statistically significant in both 
estimated models (ROE and Q) and as it was expected with lower positive 
coefficients in the crisis sub-period.  
 
The study verifies Demsetz and Villalonga’s (2001) evidence for non-significance of 
the SIZE variable on market firm valuation [ix]. For this reason, it is entered the 
growth rate of this variable (SIZEgr) in the models which has proved statistically 
significant and positively related to both ROE and Q functions, during the pre-crisis 
period (2000-2009) [x]. As it is concern, market to book value (MTOB), its use 
makes sense only in the first model of ROE, as Q has the same nominator with it. It 
has proved the economically expected positive estimation for the euphoria period 
2000-’09, while negative for the crisis one.  
 
The latter may be understood from the market faith on listed firms in the ASE that 
gives a tolerance period in negative returns of companies, believed that it is mainly 
due to the negative political environment, producing country risk. This evidence is 
consistent with trend statistics in Table 2 and moreover with pairwise correlations of 
Table 3. Finally, the leverage variable (LEV2) is used only in first sub-period 2000-
2009, because its other version enters interacting with the dummy of crisis (dcrisis) 
in the rest periods. Q-LEV2 should have a negative correlation as it can be seen by 
the relative statistically significant pairwise respective coefficient in Table 3, which 
is confirmed by the respective negative coefficient in the relevant model 2 (Table 5).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper explores the relationship between market value of non-financial listed 
firms in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) and cash holdings as well as ownership 
concentration. The question is specified in two research hypotheses concerning these 
determinants while including the interactions terms leverage or firms’ size growth 
associated with Eurozone crisis. 
 
As far as it is known it is the first time that these two independents (CASH and 
OWN5) are used to test nonlinear relations of ROE or Tobin’s Q ratio (Q). In 
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addition, the latter is tested for Greek panel data and time period 2000-2015, 
including the ongoing crisis (2010-2015). So, this article contributes to the literature 
by filling in the gap of no empirical evidence on European data especially during the 
crisis. 
 
The effective sample of 183 listed non-financial companies contains about 1,524 
firm-year observations of the unbalanced Greek panel dataset, 2000-2015. The full 
sample split in two sub-periods (2000-2009 and 2010-2015), with the breakpoint in 
2010. The latter it is justified by accepting the effective bankruptcy of the Greek 
public sector in that year, as the major event of an inevitable crisis of weak 
internationally competitive production, that altered the economic history of the 
country (Bank of Greece, 2106). 
 
Because of the “Narrow Market” in Greece (ASE), it is logical to assume that the 
market value of the listed firms of the sample should be caused by cash and 
ownership structure, as well as, other control variables of course, some of them 
presented in the estimated equation (1). Thus, it makes sense to ssume no-
endogeneity problems in this study, which allowed having used feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS) estimators to the proposed panel data empirical models. 
 
The findings are interesting and mixed compared to the literature. The concave 
function of ROE or Q on CASH is strongly confirmed for the full sample period 
(2000-2015) and during the crisis sub-period (2010-2015) too, allowing not having 
rejected the first research hypothesis (H1). At the same time, it is provided empirical 
support to the tradeoff theory which suggests an optimum cash level maximizing 
firms’ market value. However, linear and positive statistically significant 
relationship between ROE or Q and CASH has been revealed for the first sub-period 
2000-2009. This deviation from nonlinearity may be understood by the euphoria that 
prevailed the first decade of EMU markets, when all figures had just an upward 
tendency.  
 
Nevertheless, the expected (H1) concave function of the market value of Greek firms 
on top 5 major shareholders (OWN5) is strongly confirmed only for the crisis sub-
period (2010-2015) and only if firms’ market value approximated by the ROE 
variable. In contrast, it is not accepted, for all three sample periods, in the case of the 
relationship Q-OWN5, which the study confirms a convex function. So, the convex 
function of Q on OWN5 may be understood as an indication having happened 
“expropriation effects” for stocks in the ASE, which throughout the 16 years sample 
period were undervalued. Thus, the concave function of firms’ value and ownership 
concentration as well as the associated H1 has only been partly confirmed from this 
study. 
 
Moreover, the paper provides empirical evidence to the interaction terms of 
“leverage-crisis” or “firm’s size growth-crisis” which both have been proved 
significant. The special economic and political context of the Eurozone crisis has 
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seriously negatively influenced business adjustment in the ASE listed firms, 
allowing not having rejected the second research hypothesis (H2) on interaction 
terms, while, it could help in understanding the partial verification of the first 
hypothesis (H1) too.  
 
Policy implications are straightforward from the findings of the study. These 
concern not only managers who have to search for the optimal level of cash and 
ownership but also control debt and assets in order to attract investors. Both 
managers and investors could be benefited from the estimated here max points of 
ROE functions in relation either to CASH which have been founded to be 0.83 of net 
assets, during the whole sample period 2000-’15, while 0.77 in the crisis one 2010-
’15, or in the case of OWN5 to be 0.10 of equity, during the sample period, while 
0.36 in the crisis one.  They also concern EU-Greek policy makers in the perspective 
to integrate open capital markets in the EMU, as it was the case of ECB Governor’s 
M. Draghi commitment as of 26-7-2012 speech “…Within our mandate, the ECB is 
ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough. 
…” (Draghi, 2012). Further research needs to be done to verify the evidence of this 
paper for a larger dataset in the Eurozone, distinguishing South West Euro Area 
Periphery (Aizenman, et al., 2013) and the Core of EMU members. 
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